Ethnicity, voter alignment and political party affiliation - an African case: Zambia by Erdmann, Gero
www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers
GIGA Research Programme:
¢ȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱ¢
___________________________
Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and 
ȱ¢ȱĜȱȮȱ
an African Case: Zambia
Gero Erdmann
N° 45 March 2007	

	




	 !
"#$
%&'#()&*&+'(#
((**#&,*&#**$-*)
&#&#.*'/)&(&
(&$*((&'#(*(*
&(*&)$0(#&+&&&$
&'#()**((&-'/&
****/(/&*(#'+&*
&'#(+1
	




*&(&1"*&#2#*
 
***3


&'#(1456&7## &#$8
0(#&&19



(*1:;&:"&-



  '# (  )     *&#  & +1
+++$## &#$	+'#(($'#(*($<
(*#*)=*&#$<.(
**1

 1+'#((7## &#$
&1>>?@A 



	


	

		
	


	
	
		

		
 
	

	!
"#$

	

%
&'
()
*	
+		',,,*)
*	+-"".
	

				
				
	
			



	
/
0	

,))	)
1%2
0	)	11	0	
0
	)0


2
%


1*3	1	)%
	

	

		


		1

	4)2
0		
	111%*5)		0	
1		


0

2


0	%
6	)	)
1%	

0	


	

	0	

	
2
%
41	

%
)	
%1
*5)	

%2

	
71
,)1)
	2
%	)%
		*
8
	))		
			)
10
1
	


		)
21
2)	
)	
	2	


0
	
			)
1
*
)	
)	
	)

1
2

2
	
%,)
	2
1
2
%41


1
11

	
	,		
2
%

	)
1%9)	

2
0	))	%
	
	)
1
	*

:	%,
' 11	0	4	)
1%40
	)0
4212
%	
1
4
212
%
46


0	

)22	
,2
	2
	
)	;)

<		
)	
1

	1
4
=

114/40		
!>!;4"">*



	
	
	
211	
4	

		
1)=	,)	
	
1


$	
3	

81	*
/
1'	


()
*	4,		')2'*)
*		


*





	
 !	"#
		
		
$	%	
+)0	
)	

<	1)
21)	
-
		

?

,	

	
1)
,
	
* 	,@)
1) ,
 
	
	
4  &)
A  	 :
?
	 
+)0	
)	

	-
		
	1)
?
	
*B		
	
)1)

		
	
+)	
	
)4?

)	
	
@?1)	
=	)1)0
		
*B	0

		
	
%		
)	)
0		
C
		
*B&
	

4&)
AA1)1)	
		
+)0	
)	

	-
		

	1)2	4	
?	
	,		
	
	
&
?A

?

	*B	
%	
	

 	 	
	 	)	 0
 &
1)
A
?
	
 
 D	

	
4 	 	,		
	)1)	


*&
	4	)
1)	+)0	
)	

-
	
	
1)0
	
	
	)
1)	

22	

	
	

	
1)	1)

	0
	

<	

	
&)
A)A
*&
	
	
	44,	

1)?	
	
		)
1)	

22	
	
C
	

22	
?	
	
-
		
	
	
4	1),	
,
41)

?
	:

	
	

	
9,
		

1)
1)	,	4&)
A
?	
		2	*Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation –
an African Case: Zambia 
Gero Erdmann 
Article Outline 
1. Introduction 
2. Voter Alignment and Ethnicity 
3. Ethnicity, Party System and Voter Alignment in Zambia 
4. Partisanship: Survey Data 
5. Conclusion 
‘… voters are not fools.’ 
(Valdimir O. Key, 1966) 
1. Introduction1
Voting behaviour and political party alignment in Africa’s young multi-party regimes – 
whether democratic or hybrid – is an almost completely ignored research topic, although 
this is a classical field of political science. Voting behaviour is usually explained by socio-
structural, socio-psychological, or rational choice models, at least for industrialised societies. 
For African societies voting is explained predominantly by factors such as ethnicity, per-
sonal ties, and clientelism (Hyden and Leys 1972; Barkan 1979; Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997; Van de Walle 2003; Mozzafar et al. 2003; 2005; Erdmann 2004; Posner 2005). Elsewhere 
we have modified the social structural model of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to argue that that 
ethnicity provides the basic social cleavage for voting behaviour and the formation of parties 
                                                     
1   A first draft of the paper was prepared for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Asso-
ciation, San Francisco, CA, November 16-19, 2006, (Re) Thinking Africa and the World: Internal 
Reflections, External Responses’. The research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) which sponsored the research project ‘Political Parties 
and Party Systems in Anglophone Africa – Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia’. In 
addition, I would like to thank Joanna Münkner and Julia Scheller who helped to compile parts of 
the statistics, and Sven Buth for administering and computing our survey data. Neo Simutanyi or-
ganised the survey team in Zambia, and without his knowledge, support and advice this study 
would look differently. I owe him a great deal. 6 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation
and party systems (Erdmann and Weiland 2000; Erdmann 2004). The all-inclusive relevance 
of ethnicity for an understanding of African politics, in general, has been emphasised in a 
recent collection on ethnicity and democracy in Africa (Berman et al. 2004). 
The claim that ethnicity is a major factor for voting behaviour is usually inferred from elec-
tion results. Citizens of specific districts or regions which are populated (predominantly) by 
a particular ethnic group vote for one party one election after the other. Often this is also re-
lated to a general local wisdom that claims a close relationship between a particular party 
and ethnic group, for example, being a ‘Tonga-party’ in Zambia or an ‘Akan-party’ in 
Ghana. No doubt this kind of inference might entail an ecological fallacy. While aggregate 
data of the national level strongly support this link, individual voters might not have been 
motivated by ethnicity but by a different rationale. Staffan Lindberg and Minion K.C. Morri-
son (2007) have recently pointed to this possibility and challenged the ‘conventional wis-
dom’ about the African voter. Based on interviews in Ghana, in which interviewees ex-
plained why they voted for a particular candidate, they conclude that ‘clientelistic and eth-
nic predisposed voting are minor features of the Ghanaian electorate’ (2007: 34). It should be 
noted that nobody is suggesting that ethnicity is the only factor that explains partisan 
alignment in Africa, but it is the predominant social cleavage (Erdmann 2004: 70-73) or one 
important factor structuring voting behaviour (Nugent 2004). It has been emphasised that 
there is no clear-cut pattern of how ethnicity affects party formation (Erdmann 2004: 71). 
The second problem is that there is hardly any research on political party affiliation (mem-
bership) in Africa. Only Michael Bratton and his colleagues (Bratton et al. 2005) used the 
concept of party identification in the Afrobarometer. They use party identification as a 
measure for the linkage of political parties to the mass public. They used the question (‘feel-
ing close to a political party’) primarily to find out about party affiliation as an independent 
variable to explain institutional influences on attitudes towards reform politics. However, 
they also claim on the basis of their survey results that new political parties are not ‘forming 
primarily along ethnic lines’. Although they do not deny that ‘ethnic identities and griev-
ances constitute an important basis of party affiliation’, they ‘suspect’ that ‘parties are form-
ing along more pluralistic lines’ (Bratton et al. 2005: 257). 
Based on an opinion survey in Zambia we want to find out what might explain partisan 
alignment and party affiliation in competitive African multi-party regimes. Our major focus 
will be on ethnicity as a socio-structural factor. Socio-structural factors are thought to ex-
plain long term determinants of partisan alignment. I will ignore the short-term factors that 
influence electoral decisions. Party affiliation identified through party identification and 
party membership is a better indicator of partisanship and should give more precise infor-
mation about the basis of party formation. Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation 7
In the first section we explain our theoretical approach in terms of various models of voting 
behaviour. This will also include a discussion of ethnicity as an evaluative or non-evaluative 
dimension of voting – or, put differently, as a non-rational vis á vis rational evaluative be-
haviour. In the second section we discuss the particularities of the Zambian party system in 
relation to ethnic groups and voting behaviour. In the third section we turn to a description 
of our survey material and the problems involved before we present the analysis of our data 
in the forth section. In the conclusion we discuss the wider implications of our findings for 
further research. 
2. Voter Alignment and Ethnicity 
Many political scientists believe that voting behaviour and partisanship is such a complex 
phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single model (Roth 1998: 23). There are three 
classical approaches to the problem, the sociological (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), party identi-
fication (Campbell et al. 1954; 1960) and the rational choice model (Downs 1957; Key 1966; 
Fiorina 1981). 
According to the party identification model, voter alignment is shaped by the perception of 
three factors: candidates, issues, and links between parties and social groups. However, the 
latter factor, the social dimension is conceptually not well elaborated. Party identification is 
loosely understood as a socio-psychological product of family and social group ties, and the 
focus of the model is on the functions of party identification (Dalton 2001: 20-21). It is impor-
tant to note here that party identification does not only have a direct impact on voting deci-
sions but also on the perception of candidates and issues. Put differently, party identification 
shapes the evaluation of candidates, issues, and the expected capacity of parties to solve 
problems.
A pure rational choice approach ignores the fact that political perceptions and evaluations 
are structured by ‘predisposed’ partisan attitudes such as party identification. The pure 
model cannot explain why a substantial number of voters support the same party election 
after election despite changes in government and policy performance. The model is not in-
terested in where the voters’ values come from, which coordinate their decisions. No doubt, 
however, it is useful to explain the electoral behaviour of those voters with a weak or no 
party identification, whose numbers have increased in old democracies and in young de-
mocracies of Eastern and Southern Europe. It may also help to understand why people vote 
different from their party identification, and why they chose a candidate or how they decide 
on issues. The modified rational choice model takes the voter as ‘an appraiser of past events’ 8 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation
(Key 1966; Fiorina 1981) who judges retrospectively on the past performance of government. 
This modified model takes for granted that voters identify with parties. The major difference 
to the party identification model is, however, that the identification is determined by ra-
tional calculation or reflection and not by affective ties which are crucial for the party identi-
fication model. 
Finally, the cleavage model of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) provides the 
backbone for the two other models. According to research on voter alignment in Europe, the 
socio-structural model is still the best for explaining party alignment for most of the elector-
ate despite increasing voter de-alignment. This applies even to highly mobile societies such 
as post-war West Germany where socio-structural determinants such as capital/labour and 
religion/no-religion are still the most reliable explanans (Roth 1998: 32). 
To sum up, the rational choice model helps to explain why some citizens change their vote. 
The party identification model provides an understanding why many citizens do not change 
their vote, and the sociological model explains why people identify with particular parties in 
a number of elections (often undisturbed by the government’s performance). 
The question, then, is what is the crucial cleavage for voter alignment in Africa? The cleav-
age model was constructed on the historical experience of party formation and voter align-
ment in Western Europe. It comprises an analytical framework which combines a structural 
with an actor oriented approach. The cleavage denotes an institutionalised political conflict 
that is anchored in a society’s social structure. This conflict is comprised of at least four di-
mensions: socio-economic, an interest or value orientated dimension, a party political di-
mension, and a dimension of voter alignments. The traditional cleavages in Europe were 
centre vs. periphery (nation state), church (or religion) vs. state (secularisation), rural-
agrarian vs. urban-trade (primary vs. secondary economy), and finally capital vs. labour as a 
consequence of the industrial revolution. All four cleavages were articulated in the politics 
of western European states, and they were held to occur in a historical sequence as indicated 
above.
As has been argued elsewhere, most of the traditional European social conflicts can be iden-
tified in Africa as well, but they are weakly developed and contribute little or in a few cases 
only to the formation of parties and party alignment (Erdmann and Weiland 2001: 253-257). 
However, the crucial and predominant cleavage in most African societies is ethnic and/or 
regional identity (Scarrit and Mozzafar 1999; Erdmann and Weiland 2001; Erdmann 2004).2
                                                     
2   Although Lipset and Rokkan did not address problems of ethnic or regional politics explicitly, 
these can be subsumed under the centre-periphery cleavage. This cleavage is based on the concept 
of ‘territorial opposition’ which is characterised under conditions of universal suffrage as the Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation 9
Ethnicity is here understood not as a primordial or essentialist attribute but as a historically 
and socially constructed identity and one that is multifaceted, changeable, and has multiple 
meanings. Ethnicity is constituted by the interaction of self-ascription and ascription by oth-
ers (Young 1976; Lentz 1994: 25; Lentz and Nugent 2000: 2-6). Ethnicity is not a question of 
fixed boundaries or neatly delineated entities. Ethnic cleavages are variable, and ethnicity 
can, but need not, lead to voter alignment. This depends on the way ethnic identities are po-
litically developed. 
There is no clear-cut pattern of how ethnicity structures party formation and partisanship, 
and how it affects voter alignment. This can only be analysed in a historical perspective that 
takes the particular contingencies into account. These in turn depend on the geographical 
distribution of ethnic groups in each country: concentration and dispersion, their numbers 
and sizes, relations between the groups, and, very importantly, the sort of socio-economic 
differences that exist between groups and how these differences are perceived.3 Most crucial 
is the degree to which ethnicity is politically mobilised. To some degree, party formation 
and party politics can contribute to the process of what has been called the ‘imagination’ of 
ethnic identities, the degree of their political mobilization and hence voter alignment. 
With the exception of a few countries, most African societies are characterised by a high 
number of ethnic groups of different sizes. It is only in Botswana, Namibia, Burundi, and 
Rwanda that we find an ethnic group that counts for a large portion or even for a majority of 
the population. And even in these cases the main group can be broken down into smaller 
groups. In most African countries, none of the ethnic groups can claim majority status. A 
simple equation of ethnic groups, ethnic cleavage, political parties and voter alignment is 
not possible. A social cleavage needs to be politicised and transformed by the political elite 
before it leads to party formation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). But not all politicised social 
cleavages are necessarily transformed into party formation as the politicization can, for in-
stance, ‘stop’ at level of a social movement. As regards the development of an ethnic cleav-
age, Mozzafar et al. (2003: 382) describe this evolution in a three-step process: the ‘construc-
tion’ of an ethnic identity, its ‘politicisation’, and finally ‘particization’, a term borrowed 
from Gary Cox (1997: 26). 
Pure ethnic parties – parties supported by the electorate of one ethnic group only – are the 
exception rather than the rule in Africa. The rule is the ethnic congress party which is also 
ethnicity based, but formed by an elite coalition of two or more ethnic groups (Erdmann 
                                                                                                                                         
‘commitment to the locality and its dominant culture: you vote with your community and its lead-
ers irrespective of your economic position’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 13). 
3   Daniel N. Posner (2004) explains the problem excellently with the example of the alliance and con-
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2002: 270-8; 2004: 78-80) which provide the focus for voter alignments. Thus, for the purpose 
of our analysis, which will deal with a ‘politicised’ ethnicity for voter alignments, we do not 
need to consider all ethnic groups within a country, but only with ‘ethnopolitical groups’ 
(Scarrit and Mozzafar 1999) which, in fact, might be comprised of a number of ethnic 
groups. The general conceptual problems that have been indicated above for ethnic groups 
apply to ethno-political groups as well – although the polarisation is already included in the 
concept. There are a number of strong indicators that ethnic cleavages have been politicised 
into ethno-political groups and even particised, i.e. transformed into parties and party sys-
tems. In a number of countries the ethnic cleavage constellation and party formation to-
gether with voter alignment of the 1950s and 1960s correspond to the evolution of party 
formation and voter alignments of the 1990s (see for example Ghana and Zambia, and even 
Tanzania).
Ethnopolitical identities and ethnopolitical (or ethnic) voting is not a non-rational, merely af-
fective or ‘predisposed’ behaviour as suggested by Lindberg and Morrison (2007).4 Eth-
nopolitical voting has also a rational dimension. In a situation of uncertainty it is rational to 
rely on things one knows – first, on the smaller and then on the extended family, on per-
sonal friends, neighbours, villagers, people from the next village, from the district, from the 
same ethnic sub-group, the same ethnic group etc. Although family or village ties are not 
always friendly, in case of an unknown ‘challenge’ posed from outside, the alliance and reli-
ance on the next comes down to a decision to ‘rely on the devil we know’ – as villagers often 
explain their voting in favour of a particular party. The electoral decision for a candidate 
from the same village or the same ethno-political group becomes even more rational if the 
prevailing perception is that members of the other group will vote for a member of their 
group. The implicit assumption is that the elected person will, in the first instance, take care 
of his own kin before of any other; the elected might do that from his own will, but as eve-
rybody knows, he or she will also come under direct pressure from his own kin to serve 
them at first. In this sense ethnic or ethno-political identities are the basis of strategic choices 
for partisanship and voting decisions. As Dan Posner (2005: 91) puts it: ‘it is the information 
that ethnicity is assumed to convey about likely patterns of patronage distribution – not ata-
vism or tradition – that explains why it plays such an important role.’ 
                                                     
4   Lindberg and Morrison distinguish between ‘evaluative’ and ‘non-evaluative’ voting behaviour; 
the later is based on clientelism, on personal affective ties of patronage, family, or service, and on 
‘proxy voting’ which implies the prevalence of family, clan and ‘ethnically predisposed voting’ 
(2007: 5, 9, 33). It is not at all clear why, for example, especially voting influenced by patronage or 
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While Lindberg and Morrison found that the voters evaluative behaviour is related to the 
actual or expected performance of the candidates, the ‘conventional’ ethnic proposition is 
that candidates do not bother very much about the candidate, all that is important is 
whether a party is ‘identified with the voter’s own ethnic group, no matter who the individ-
ual candidates happen to be’ (Horowitz 1985: 319-20). At that time other scholar took a kind 
of middle way (Hyden and Leys 1972; Barkan 1979), and related to elections in single-party 
regimes where only candidates could compete: ‘All the constituency reports without excep-
tion emphasised the priority accorded by voters to the candidates tribe (in urban areas) and 
clans (in rural areas). Ascriptive group membership was still seen by nearly all voters as the 
sine qua non of acceptability and trustworthiness. Subject to this criterion the next test to be 
applied to a candidate was his probable performance in securing government services for 
the constituency’ (Hyden and Leys 1972: 401). Joel D. Barkan (1979: 84) argued similarly: the 
first criteria is ethnic belonging, the second expected performance of the candidates. With-
out discussing the rationale of ethnic voting they bring in an evaluative dimension when it 
comes to the second criterion for the voters’ decision which is not directed by abstract uni-
versal issues but by a ‘pork-barrel’ orientation. 
3. Ethnicity, Party System and Voter Alignment in Zambia 
Numerous authors have identified ethnicity as one crucial dimension of Zambian politics 
(Molteno 1974; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996; Osei-Howedie 1998; Burnell 2001: 249-50; 2005: 
113-115; Posner 2005). Others however, have discussed the evolution and development of 
the Zambian party system without any reference to ethnicity (Rakner and Svåsand 2004). 
Usually more than 70 ethnic groups are accounted for in Zambia. According to Africa South 
of Sahara (2004: 1195) the number is 73 and according to Morrison (1989: 702) it is 72. Offi-
cially there are seven language groups: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi (Barotse), Kaonde, 
Lunda und Luvale; in the daily political discourse they are referred to as Bemba-, Nyanja-
speakers etc. During the 1960s and 1970s at least the Bemba-, Tonga-, Lozi- and Nyanja-
speakers were discerned as political identities – at least at the elite level (Molteno 1974). 
Daniel Posner (2005: 232-41) used, apart from tribal identities, these four language groups 
together with the ‘Northwestern’ (Lunda-Luvale speakers) as the major units in his analysis 
of ethnic voting. Nowadays all the seven language groups can be considered as important 
ethno-political identities, but there are probably even more. One example is the Mwambe-
speakers whose politicians are striving for a separate North-Eastern Province, distinct from 
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Mambwe-speakers are considered to be Bemba by those who live in the South, West and 
East.5 As indicated above, each ethno-regional group is comprised of a number of single 
ethnic groups which again, if used by a politician, could become the basis for a distinct po-
litical group identity. For instance, the group of Bemba-speakers account for 20, Lozi-
speakers for 17, and Mambwe-speakers for five ethnic groups. Hence Lozi-speakers might 
be Lozis, but can have a different ethnic (or tribal) identity such as Kwandi, Koma, Mwenyi 
or Simaa etc. The same applies to the other ethno-political groups. The point here is that 
ethnicity is differently politicised and mobilised among the different ethnic groups. While 
Lozi, Bemba, Nyanja and Tonga regularly feature in the public discourse, other ethnic 
groups, for example from North-Western Province, are mentioned less. This difference may 
be explained partly by the size of the groups and their political history in Zambia’s body 
politics. Another implication is that very different and complicated alliances and coalitions 
between the various ethnic and ethno-regional groups are possible which can, to some de-
gree, criss-cross each other in various ways. 
A final comparison of the number of ethnic groups and the number of political parties illus-
trates the point about the relationship between ethnic groups and political parties. While 
more than 70 ethnic groups have been identified, there were only 26 parties registered in 
2004, of which seven could be termed relevant parties being represented in parliament (and 
displaying some kind of national visibility – see table 5). 
As suggested above, ethno-regional cleavages were constitutive for the dominant party sys-
tem of the First Republic (table 1). The dominant United National Independence Party 
(UNIP), which in 1972 became the single state party, comprised a broad elite coalition of 
various ethnic groups. The dominant groupings were the Bemba-speakers of Northern-, 
Luapula- and Copperbelt Province, and Nyanja-speakers of Eastern Province, but comprised 
Tonga- and Lozi-speakers as well. UNIP was often identified as a Bemba-party, whose for-
mer leader Kenneth Kaunda was born in Northern Province (Chinsali) (although he origi-
nated from the Tonga in former Nyasaland, Malawi). 
The smaller opposition parties had their electoral basis in the southern and western parts of 
the country, the African National Congress (ANC, 1951-1972) among the Tonga- speakers 
(Southern Province), the United Party (UP, 1966-68) among the Lozi of Western Province, 
which after the ban of UP were united in an alliance of Lozi- and Tonga-speakers for the 
elections of 1968. Table 2 identifies the provincial strongholds of the ANC and UNIP. 
                                                     
5   Another example are the Tumbuka and Nsenga of Eastern Province. From outside the province 
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Table 1:  Parliamentary election results, distribution of seats 1964*, 1968 
1964 1968  Party  Founding
year % Seats % Seats
United National Independence Party (UNIP) 1959 69.1 55 73.2  53  (28)** 
African National Congress (ANC)  (1948) 1951 30.5 10 25.4  23
National Progressive Party (NPP)  1963 (10)* -
Independents 0.4 1.4  1
Number of parties in parliament  2 (3)  2
Notes: *  Reserved seats for Europeans; 23,981 registered voters compared to 876,212 of the common (African) roll. 
** In ( ) number of uncontested seats. 
Sources: Nuscheler 1978: 1793-5; slightly different figures in Krennerich 1999. 
However, the ethnic party alignment was not at all straightforward. As indicated above, 
Tonga- and Lozi-speakers were also among the membership of UNIP. During the party elec-
tions in 1967 the two major contending groupings were based on the following ethno-
regional alliances or coalitions: Bemba-Tonga-speakers (North-South alliance) against Lozi-
Nyanja-speakers (West-East alliance). The party elections resulted in members of the Lozi-
grouping to leave UNIP and to join UP. 
Table 2:  Provincial strongholds (above the national average), in 1968 elections, no. of 
seats and % 
UNIP ANC Independents  Province 
% Seats % Seats % Seats 
Central1 72.6 13 24.8  3 2.5  -
Eastern 95.0  8 (6)*  5.0  - -
Luapula  98.8  2 (8)  1.2  - -
Northern 99.4  6 (10)  0.6  - -
Northwestern 89.6  2 (4)  10.4  - -
Southern 24.7  1 70.8  12 5.5 1
Western2 92.3  18 7.7 - -
Barotse3 38.4 3 61.6  8-
Total 73.2  53  (28)  25.4  23
Notes:  * In ( ) uncontested seats. 
1 Central comprised today’s Lusaka and Central Province. 
2 Western is today’s Copperbelt. 
3 Barotse is today’s Western Province. 
Sources: Nuscheler 1978: 1795; slightly different figures in Krennerich 1999. 
During the party formation of the First Republic and before the establishment of the one-
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of Bemba-speakers of Northern Province which also gained support from party cadres in the 
Copperbelt (Tordoff and Molteno 1974; Molteno 1974; Tordoff and Scott 1974). All this indi-
cates that at that time different sorts of alliance between ethnic and ethno-political elites 
were possible for party formation – and, as inferred from electoral results, for voter align-
ment accordingly. 
After re-democratisation in 1991 the Zambian polity re-emerged as a dominant party system 
for two elections (table 3), but ended as a non-dominant party system after the third elec-
tions. Already in 1996 the political parties showed a substantial degree of volatility which 
increased during the 2001 elections and revealed how unstable and fragmented the party 
system is. The high degree of volatility especially in the 2001 elections indicated that a sub-
stantial number of voters had no or very little party attachment or identification. Within ten 
years the share of votes for MMD, the party that was formed in 1991 out of the democracy 
movement, declined tremendously by about 45%. The UNIP suffered a similar fate after al-
most 20 years of single-party rule, when the party fell apart and was reduced to a regional 
party in 1991. 
Between the 2001 and 2006, MMD consolidated its position despite new split-offs. In 2006 
PUDD was formed which was allegedly supported by former MMD-president Chiluba who 
later even openly supported PF during the elections campaign 2006 against his former party. 
At the same time, the major opposition parties formed electoral alliances in order to chal-
lenge the MMD more seriously than in 2001, when MMD won only because the opposition 
vote was divided among several parties; UPND, UNIP and FDD formed the United Democ-
ratic Alliance (UDA), and a number of smaller parties the National Democratic Focus (NDF). 
The fragmentation of the party system was a result of various factional tendencies within the 
parties, especially the ruling MMD, which had a personal as well as an ethnic distributive 
character.6 As illustrated in table 4, all the parties had clear provincial strongholds of which 
some reflected the cleavages of the 1960s. The concentration on a few strongholds applies in 
particular to the two parties that came second and third in the national contest, namely 
UNDP and UNIP in 2001, and for the PF in 2001 and especially in 2006. 
As a newcomer, the UNDP was able to mobilise voters especially in three provinces of the 
Southern and Western parts of the country where the party’s voter share was above the na-
tional average of the party. The exceptional strength in the South as well as its Tonga-leader 
explains partly why the party became known as a ‘Tonga-party’. The regional pattern also 
applies to UNIP which dominated the East. But the party was referred to with a provincial 
label (Eastern Province party) rather than an ethnic label, because the Nyanja-speakers of the 
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East were not viewed as ethnically homogenous as the Tonga-speakers. The smaller parties 
were basically no different. Only the MMD maintained several strongholds in the country, 
Luapula, Northern and the Copperbelt, of which the first two were clearly rural Bemba terri-
tories while the Copperbelt is strongly mixed (multi-ethnic) but with a substantial Bemba 
community as well. PF, which in 2006 became the second strongest party, was identified as a 
Bemba party as well. 
Table 3:  Parliamentary Election Results and Distribution of seats in the Zambian 
parliament after the elections of 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006* 
1991 1996 2001 2006  Party  Regis-
tration  % Seats % Seats % Seats  %1 Seats2
UNIP 1959 23.60 25 Boycott  10.39 13 4
MMD 1991 71.96 125 56.59 131 27.48 69 43.0  73
NP 1993 8.08 5
ZDC 1995 13.41 2 
AZ 1996  1.51 2 4
UPND 1998 23.31 49
ZRP 2000  5.43 1 5
PF 2001 2.76 1 21.0  43
FDD 2001 15.25 12 4
HP 2001 7.41 4
NDF 2006 1 
UDA 2006 21.7  26
ULP 2006 2 
Independents 10.06 10 3.32 1 3
No. of relevant parties  2 4 (5)3 75
Notes:  UNIP = United National Independence Party; MMD = Movement for Multi-party Democracy; NP = Na-
tional Party; ZDC = Zambia Democratic Congress; AZ = Agenda for Zambia; UPND = United Party for 
National Development; ZRP = Zambia Republican Party; PF = Patriotic Front; FDD = Forum for Democ-
ratic Development; HP = Heritage Party; NDF = National Democratic Focus, Alliance of ZRP and 4 
other parties; UDA = United Democratic Alliance of UPND, FDD and UNIP; ULP = United Liberal 
Party. 
    * Without by-elections. 
1 Others account for 14.3%, calculations provided by Neo Simutanyi. 
2 Two constituencies without result; death of a candidate. 
3 In ( ) five parties because of the boycott of UNIP which would have won a number of seats. 
4 Member of UDA. 
5 Member of NDF. 
Sources: Electoral Commission of Zambia 1996; 2002; 2006; Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 31; Botterweck 2006. 
As regards some features of basic cleavages and the ethno-political confrontation, the UPND 
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basis for party formation and for voter alignment (see above, and table 2 and 4; Burnell 
2001).
Table 4:  Provincial strongholds (above the national average), in 2001 elections, % of 
votes (rounded) and number of seats 
MMD 96  MMD UPND UNIP FDD HP ZRP PF Province 
% Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats
Central 48 7 26 5 12 2
Copperbelt 68 35 20 1 17 1 75
Eastern 59 1 35 12 26 51
Luapula1 68 50 13 14 3
Lusaka 61 1 4 29 68 1
Northern 61 38 20 12 9 61
N/Western 43 3 39 9
Southern  54 1 62 18
Western 48 3 41 13 1
National 57 28 69 23 49 10 13 15 12 7 5 1 3 1
Note:  1 One seat won by an independent candidate. 
Source:  Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
None of the parties mentioned was based on a single ethnic group or tried to find the sup-
port of only one ethno-political group by mobilising explicitly a particular ethnic sentiment. 
As can be seen in table 5, all major political parties represented in parliament made an effort 
to present candidates in almost all constituencies in the country for the 2001 parliamentary 
elections – at least for UPND, UNIP, FDD and even ZRP, given that particularly the latter 
two, as well as some others were formed only a few months before the election date. 
Table 5:  Number of party candidates for parliamentary elections 1991-2006 
MMD UNIP ZDC NP NLP UPND FDD ZRP HP PF NCC Others
1991 149  150  *
1996 150  2** 141  91 83 - - - - - - 5951
2001 150  146  -1 2 3149 149  139  126 102 78 1,1982
2006 150  3 nc 14233nc nc 1224 nc
Notes:  * 21 independents and 9 other parties. 
** boycott of the party; but 2 candidates run under the UNIP label.
1 5 other parties with less than 11 candidates each and 99 independents (AZ = 11). 
2 9 other parties with 23 and less candidates each and 84 independents (AZ = 17). 
3 Member of the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), in 2 of the constituencies, only FDD and UNIP  
   filed a candidate; 2 constitutencies missing (no results). 
4 In electoral alliance with United Liberal Party (ULP) an offspring of UPND. 
nc = not counted. 
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A closer inspection of the party strongholds reveals that only a few constituencies had clear 
majorities. In 2001, little more than a quarter of the 150 constituencies (39), had majorities of 
more than 50% for the winning candidate (table 6). The parties concerned were MMD and 
UPND. In fact, they won most of these constituencies in the heartland of the ethnic group 
they were identified with – the MMD, above all, in the Bemba-speaking districts of Luapula 
where the party won in 9 out of the 14 constituencies with more than 50%, and even in three 
with more than 60%. The UPND strongholds in the Tonga-speaking areas were even 
stronger; the party won three-quarter of the 19 seats in Southern Province with more than a 
50% margin, and ten with more than 60%, topped by four with more than 70%. 
Most of the constituencies were located not only in the Luapula and Southern Province, the 
Bemba- and Tonga-speakers heartland, but in rural areas as well. Even strongholds in Cop-
perbelt and Central Province were rural constituencies. This strongly suggests that at least in 
those areas ethnic group voting took place. 
Table 6:  Party strongholds per province, number of seats won with more than 50%, 2001 
> 50%  > 60%  > 70%  Total > 50%  Province 
Seats  MMD UPND MMD UPND MMD UPND MMD UPND
Central 14 1 2 1 2
Copperbelt 22 3 3
Luapula 14 6219
Northern 21 3 3
N-western 12 2 1 2 1
Southern 19 1 10 4 15
Western 17 3 3
Total 18 21
All seats won  69 49
Source:  Electoral Commission of Zambia 2002 (own calculation). 
In 2006 a very similar though slightly different pattern emerged (table 7). The number of 
MMD-strongholds increased, and they were partly concentrated in new areas, especially 
with 11 in Central Province where the MMD presidential candidate and party leader comes 
from. MMD also increased its strongholds in the Northern and Northwestern provinces, but 
lost some of the strongholds of Luapula to PF. All this illustrates a change of ethnic alliances 
in support of MMD away from some sections of the Bemba (Luapula), but also increased 
support by others (Northern), as well as to ethnic groups in Central and Northwestern Prov-
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mainly a multi-ethnic urban vote, and it took over strongholds of MMD in the Bemba heart-
lands of Luapula where the former MMD-President Chiluba supported PF instead of MMD. 
In Luapule the switch from MMD to PF can be mainly attributed to a split within the politi-
cal elite of the Bemba; they were not voting for a different ‘ethnic’ party. 
Table 7:  Party strongholds per province, number of seats won with more than 50%, 2006 
> 50%  > 60%  > 70%  Total > 50%  Province Seats
MMD PF UPND MMD PF UPND MMD PF UPND MMD PF UPND
Central 14 5 1 3 1 3 11 2
Copperbelt 22 5 1 4 51 6 9
Eastern 19 2 2 1 4 3
Luapula 14 3 2 1 2 4 4
Lusaka 12 2 3 1 3 3
Northern 21 2 3 1 1 33 64
N-western 12 3 1 21 6
Southern 19 5 2 62 13
Western 17 3 4 2 9
Total 20 13 8 12 7 4 15 6 39 20 18
All seats won  73 43 26
Notes:  1 one constituency with > 80%. 
2 two constituencies with > 80%. 
3 three constituencies with > 80%. 
Source:  Electoral Commission of Zambia 2006 (own calculation). 
On the opposition side, UPND in Alliance with UNIP and FDD lost some of its strongholds 
but seems to be clearly the only one of the three which maintained its strongholds in South-
ern Province, in Tonga areas. The number of strongholds decreased be only two in 2006. 
Most interestingly, a comparison of the 2001 and 2006 strongholds reveals that some of them 
are actually lasting or even structural strongholds, and all of them are located in rural areas. 
In 2006 UPND retained eleven out of the 15 strongholds of 2001, and MMD retained six, but 
four others of the 2001 strongholds were simply passed on as strongholds to PF. On the ba-
sis of this we would conclude that at least eleven structural strongholds were among the 
Tonga and ten among the Bemba. 
In fact it seems very difficult to explain the difference in voting patterns between 1996 and 
2001 only by ‘evaluative voting’ without an ethnic or rational choice orientation. The per-
formance of the government was certainly poor. So how can we explain that one ethno-
political group, the Tonga-speakers, decided in very large numbers to align with a new 
party, while others, the core of Bemba-speakers, decided to continue its support for the rul-
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vote for UPND/UDA while other ethnic groups of Northwestern and Western Province 
shifted to the MMD. On the other hand, dissatisfied Bembas did not vote for UPND/UDA 
but for PF which was identified as a Bemba-party as well. Despite this fact there is no doubt 
that the PF also obtained a lot of ‘non-ethnic’ votes because its popular leader, Michael Sata 
played the populist cards including a xenophobic one rang well particularly in urban areas. 
There is hardly any other explanation possible that some kind of group voting took place 
which is inspired by a different rational – but not government performance: Many Bembas 
stuck with the Bemba-led government because they believed that, at least, some of them 
would continue to benefit from the MMD-government dominated by their ‘kin’ (some did in 
fact) – while many Tongas could not see any further benefit from voting for a ruling party 
that does not improve their livelihood. 
Up to here the argument is still based on inference from aggregated data and we still might 
be confronted with an ecological fallacy. However, the strongholds suggest that at least for 
some people, ethnic identity and ethnic rational is a factor that influences voting behaviour 
quite strongly. In addition, one should keep in mind that party formation and voter align-
ment of the Third Republic, particularly in the second half and in the 2001 elections, follows 
in some respects the cleavage lines of the 1960s. 
One argument against ethnic voting might be that different people participated in the elec-
tions – people who abstained in 1996 voted in 2001 or 2006 and vice versa. An almost com-
plete change of the electorate between the elections seems not very plausible, since we know 
that there is usually a core group of people who are interested in politics and participate in 
elections. In our 2004 survey, almost a third of the interviewees (321) participated in the 2001 
and 1996 elections, and still more than quarter (279) in all three elections since 1991. 
The strongholds of the two parties suggest, however, several things: 1. there is no clear cut 
feature of party alignment for all ethnic groups; 2. even within one ethnic group party 
alignment does not follow one line for all individuals – and non-ethnic voting is possible; 3. 
party alignment of particular ethnic groups might depend on different degrees of ethno-
political identities or/and mobilisation; 4. party alignment could be directed by divergent 
coalition building of the elite which affiliates for various reasons (internal conflicts, different 
patronage expectation etc.) with different parties which all are basically ethnic coalitions. 
It should be noted here that not only in urban areas, mainly in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, 
election results for the parties are much more volatile than in rural areas, but also in areas 
which are not that homogenous as the strongholds. 
A clear indication of the different party alignment of the political elite are the electoral re-
sults in the Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province. In 2001 no party gained an absolute majority 
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UNIP and FDD; only two seats out of 18 were captured by MMD and HP, and in four others 
the MMD candidate came in second. UNIP won seats in constituencies dominated by Chewa 
and Tumbuka constituencies, while FDD won in Chewa constitutencies as well, but also in 
Ngoni and Nsenga constituencies; HP and MMD won seats in the Nsenga-speaking area. In 
2006, in most constituencies the contest was very close between MMD and UDA of which 
FDD and UNIP – in previous elections both Eastern Province-parties – were members; only 
MMD gained two strongholds with more than 50 per cent in Nsenga areas. 
4. Partisanship: Survey Data 
For the collection of individual data to find out why people align with a particular party, we 
conducted a survey among 1.001 Zambians aged 18 years and above in March 2004. Since 
we were not able to visit all provinces, the random sampling started at the provincial level 
(six out of nine), down to the district, the ward and finally to the official enumeration area of 
the Central Statistical Office (CSO), the Census Supervisory Area (CSA). The respondents 
were randomly selected within the CSA and randomly within a CSA.7
The provincial and ethnic coverage was therefore limited to seven provinces. Some basic 
characteristics of the sample are presented in the appendices, including voting intentions. To 
identify the ethnic background of the interviewees we asked the question: ‘What is your 
tribe?’. Although this question is often viewed as controversial, the survey teams had no 
problems obtaining responses. Out of the more than 70 ethnic groups in Zambia 51 ap-
peared in the survey at least with one person (for the coverage of the major ethnic groups 
see appendix C). 
For the analysis we started with single ethnic groups as identified by interviewees. We then 
grouped them together step by step into five categories: Bemba, Tonga, Lozi, Nyanja, 
Lunda-Luvale (Northwestern). It should be noted that in our sample the Bembas are clearly 
under-represented while the Tongas are probably over-represented (see appendix C). We 
also considered only parties which were in parliament at the time of the survey. No other 
parties show up in the responses in any substantial numbers. 
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4.1. Voter Alignment 
According to the literature on voter alignment in Zambia the affiliation of a candidate is 
more important than his individual past or expected behaviour (Molteno and Scott 1974: 
192; Posner 2005: 228-232). There are exceptions of course, but members of parliament are 
usually elected on a party ticket. The parliamentary seat ‘belongs’ to the party; if a MP 
switches parties, he or she looses the seat and has to stand for a by-election. In pre-survey 
focus group discussions, the proposition that people vote for a party rather than a certain 
candidate was never challenged.8 While the idea that a parliamentary seat belongs to a party 
was publicly under debate, the responses to our related survey question whether floor-
crossing should be allowed without by-elections were very straight forward: Almost 75 per 
cent of the replies supported the current rule, and only 16 per cent said floor-crossing should 
be allowed. This very strongly supports the literature on Zambia, but also puts into question 
an approach which presupposes that voting decisions are based, above all, on candidates’ 
performance.
We also tried to get some information about the ‘local’ assessment of peoples’ voting deci-
sion for one particular party. We, however, did not ask why someone voted for a party, but 
what they think why other people vote for a party. The idea was to avoid too personal a 
question which might come into conflict with the interviewees’ perception of a socially ‘un-
wanted’ response. 
In our focus group discussions almost all people in rural areas responded that other people 
voted in a ‘tribal’ way. In urban areas (Lusaka) the responses were different; urbanites said 
their peer’s voting was program orientated, but in rural areas it was ‘tribal’.9
The responses seem to confirm Lindberg and Morrison’s (2007) finding that clientelist and 
ethnic voting (see table 8, e. and i.) is not a dominant feature, but evaluative voting which is 
directed by the parties’ programme and the satisfaction with its policy (table 8, a. and b.) is 
the major reason why people vote for a political party. At least, programmes and policies 
appear to be more important than clientelism, patronage (c.) and ethnic affiliation. 
                                                     
8   Together with Neo Simutanyi and Matthias Basedau (GIGA Institute of African Affairs) we held a 
number of focus group discussions with 29 participants in Chibombo (High School), Chibombo 
District, Central Province, 15 March 2003; in Chinyunyu (Basic School), Chongwe District, Central 
Province, 17 March 2003; and Lusaka, Longacre, 18 March 2003. 
9   A number of focus group discussions with 29 participants were held in Chibombo (High School), 
Chibombo District, Central Province, 15 March 2003; in Chinyunyu (Basic School), Chongwe Dis-
trict, Central Province, 17 March 2003; and Lusaka, Longacre, 18 March 2003. 22 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation
Table 8:  What people think about voting motives 
Question:    What do you think is the major reason why people vote for one particular 
party?*
Agree Agree strongly  Together 
a. Particular Programme 44.5  30.6  75.1 
b. Satisfaction with the policy  42.1 32.9 75.0
c. Favoured when comes to/stays in power 41.5  25.4 66.9
d. Get money  36.1 24.7 60.8
e. Friends and family do so as well  35.6 18.9 54.5
f. Leader from the same tribe  32.2 19.9 52.1
g. Tribal affiliation of party  33.5 17.6 51.1
h. Fear of intimidation 28.1  13.7  41.8 
i. Advice by traditional authority 24.4  14.6  39.0 
j. N = varies between 997 and 984 
Note:  * Responses were collected for each response separately. 
However, looking from a different perspective, the rational of programme and policy voting 
seems to be questionable – at least the respondents seem to contradict themselves. When 
asked whether they can see any differences between the parties as regards their policies and 
programmes towards various issues, only a minority of about a third or even less, depend-
ing on the issue, responded positively (table 9). When asked further about the difference be-
tween the parties, less than a third maintained the difference was ‘small’ or ‘very small’. 
Only less than a quarter of the respondents thought that the difference between the political 
parties was ‘big’ or ‘very big’ in the following policies: education and health 22.7 per cent, 
privatisation and free market 15.7 per cent, and human rights 15.5 per cent. Moreover, when 
the respondents were asked about which party cares more or is more in support of one of 
these policies, more than half pointed to the ruling MMD (education & health = 50.5%, n = 
380, and 19.2% of total; privatization and free market economy = 68.0%, n = 306, and 20.8% 
of total; human rights = 52.5%, n = 295, and 15.5% of total). 
The results from our focus group discussions might provide an additional clue what this 
could imply. As in the survey, most of the participants could not detect any programme or 
policy difference between the various parties. And the few who said they could detect dif-
ferences were, when directly challenged, almost all unable to name any difference: Only a 
few teachers pointed out (correctly) that during the 2001 elections campaign free primary 
education was a controversial issue, but only as regards the number of years which should 
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Table 9:  Programme and policy differences between political parties 
Differences 
‘yes’1,
n = 1,001 
Big/very big 
differences, 
% of ‘yes’ 
Big/very big  
differences,  
 % of total 
n = 1,001 
Health and education
37.1% 
62.0 
valid n = 366
22.7 
Privatisation and  
free market economy 
27.4% 
57.7 
valid n = 272
15.7 
Human rights 
27.8% 
56.5 
valid n = 274
15.5 
Note:  1 ‘No difference’, ‘Don’t know’, and ‘No answer’ are omitted here. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that all this does not give us a clear idea as to why 
people vote for a particular party. It only highlights the methodological issue whether this 
kind of approach can provide meaningful answers. 
To find out whether the individual’s ethnic identity has an influence on voting behaviour, a 
cross tabulation is applied with ethno-political identity as the independent and voting inten-
tion as the dependent variable. This is presented in table 10. Overall, no clear picture 
emerges from the result. No ethno-political group has a clear preference for one party, that 
is to say, more than half of the respondents of one particular group would vote for one 
party. Ignoring marginal difference below or above an average as well as smaller groups 
and parties, it is only the Tonga for UPND, the Nyanja and Lunda-Luvale for MMD that 
suggests a broader support for one party. 
Table 10: Ethno-political groups and voting intention 
Question:    If there were to be parliamentary elections today, for which political party 
would you vote? 
MMD UPND UNIP FDD PF  Others Abstain Do  not
know
Total
N%  N%   N % N % N %N%N%  N%  N %  
Bemba  49 24 28 14 16 8 7 3 33 16 11 5 39 19 18 9 201 100
Tonga  92 38 109 45 4 2 0 0 4 2 4 2 15 6 14 6 242 100
Lozi 4 2 3 83 2 2 9763311221 09 1 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 0
Nyanja 112 41 35 13 34 13 19 7 11 4 11 4 34 13 15 6 271 100
Lunda-Luvale  26 42 1 5 2 423005800 6 1 08 1 36 2 1 0 0
Others  2 2 2 91 3 1 7683434341 7 2 38 1 17 5 1 0 0
Total 343 36 232 24 69 7 32 3 57 6 31 3 121 13 77 8 962 100
Notes:  Chi-square = 217,758; df = 35; p = 0,000 (significant at the 0.05 level). 24 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation
While there is basically no surprise as regards the support UPND is getting from the Tonga, 
although it might have been expected to be stronger, a surprise might be the small number 
of Bembas in support of MMD, especially since MMD has been closely identified with this 
group. This result, however, will change if one considers the following points: First, at the 
time of the survey MMD was split in two tendencies or factions, the Mwanawasa tendency 
led by the President, and the ‘true blue faction’, supported by the former president Frederick 
Chiluba, who was prosecuted for corruption during his presidency. The later newly formed 
Party for Unity, Democracy and Development (PUDD), organised by ‘true blue’ Chiluba 
supporters was also in contact with Michael Sata’s PF, and which for a short time became 
members of the National Democratic Front, the so-called ‘Northern Alliance’ of Luapula and 
Northern Province (Erdmann 2005: 472; Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 38-39, fn 43). This 
might explain the relatively high numbers of abstainers among the Bembas. 
Second, PF must also be seen as a Bemba-party. In the 2001 elections, PF gained its support 
mainly from ‘Bemba-provinces’, Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt (table 4). Again in the 
2006 elections sweeping PF-gains were in Luapula, Northern and Copperbelt Province (table 
7). Out of the 66 seats of the three provinces PF won 36, MMD 18, and the remaining three 
were split among two independent candidates and one from National Democratic Focus 
(NDF): In many cases it was a close contest between PF and MMD which accounted for the 
overwhelming numbers of votes (Electoral Commission 2006). 
Taking MMD and PF together would make a Bemba-vote of 40% which could end up at 
about 50% or more if a number of abstainers and ‘don’t knows’, together 28% of Bembas, 
would vote in the expected way. The latter, however, is speculation. 
Thus, the reason why the Bemba support for one particular party did not show up in the 
survey was simply a political split between two parties. To put it the other way, only 32% of 
the Bembas interviewed would vote for any other party such as UPND, UNIP, FDD or ‘oth-
ers’. As regards the problem of ‘evaluative voting’ as opposed to ‘affective’ voting the ques-
tion remains as to why a substantial number of Bembas chose PF and not UPND as they 
were obviously dissatisfied with the performance of the MMD-government. 
What seems to be much more surprising is that a substantial number of Tongas, about 38%, 
would have voted for MMD. Given the history of Southern Province as ‘Tonga-land’, its 
preferential voting for opposition parties, and since UPND was identified by its political ad-
versaries as a ‘Tonga-party’ with numerous distinct strongholds in the province (table 4), 
one would have expected a different result: a higher percentage of Tongas voting for UPND 
and less for the adversary Bemba party MMD. 
A slightly different pattern applies to the party alignment of Lozis and Nyanjas. They, too, 
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by UPND (29%), and a majority of Nyanja favour MMD (41%) followed by the support for 
UNIP (13%) (table 10). Although the Lozis are considered to be close allies of the Tongas – 
examples are the elections results of the ANC in 1968 and of UPND in 2001 – a substantial 
number has aligned with MMD. This might partly be explained as a ‘switched ethnic vote’ 
in our survey, since a prominent Lozi politician, Aka Mbiskusita-Lewanika had joined the 
new MMD-government in 2002. An indication for the plausibility of this explanation is that 
when the same politician had left the party he was affiliated with during the 1990s, he and 
his party friends were re-elected twice – each time on a different party ticket.10
This result is remarkable in several ways because it concerns the two most prominent and 
most articulated ethno-political blocs in Zambia – apart from the Lozi – and which, viewed 
from the public debate, are to be considered as the most ‘particised’ ethnicities. The first ob-
servation is that no party has the undivided loyalty of one ethno-political group. The second 
is that ‘disloyalty’ can go two ways: It can remain with one party which is considered the 
right ethnic party as well, hence the vote remains ‘ethnic loyal’ or it can shift to an other 
party which is associated with a different ethnicity. The latter voting is ‘ethnic disloyal’. But 
it might be even more complicated, because there is also the possibility that people vote ‘dis-
loyal’ for the party, but ethnic loyal for the right candidate – if the ‘wrong’ party runs the 
ethnically ‘correct’ candidate. The latter is more likely to happen among small ethnic groups 
which are not so closely associated with a particular party and where the political elite has a 
choice to affiliate with different political parties or alliances. 
What is, to some degree, no surprise at all is a general observation that despite the identifica-
tion of a party with a particular ethnic group, all the major parties are multi-ethnic in the 
support they get – hence they can be considered as ethnic congress parties. The different 
ethnic groups, however, re-appear with in the various parties as ethnic based factions (Erd-
mann and Simutanyi, forthcoming). 
4.2. Party Identification and Party Membership 
As indicated above, in order to get a better understanding of party alignment and of how 
the parties are linked with Zambian society, we applied the concept of party identification in 
our survey. Although there are some doubts, particularly in Western Europe, whether the 
                                                     
10   Aka Mbiskusita-Lewanika linked to the royal Barotse-clan, started as a founding member of 
MMD; after disagreeing with the non-reform policies of the first MMD government, he left MMD 
and was re-elected on a National Party ticket in his home area; again, when he fell-out with his 
NP-friends he became a founding member and leader of Agenda Zambia (AZ), and together with 
some other Lozi friends he was elected on this party ticket; AZ won substantial votes only in 
Western Province in Lozi areas. Later, he re-joined MMD. AZ was probably the only ethnic party 
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concept can be applied to other democratic polities, because it might lack some of its analyti-
cal power, it has been widely applied in other democratic systems (Dalton 2000; Harrop and 
Miller 1987: 131-145; Roth 1999: 41-47) and in Africa as well (Bratton at al 2005: 256-261). The 
idea is that party identification is an organising ‘tool’ for the perception, evaluation, and be-
haviour of citizens. Party identification does influence voting: ‘This cue-giving function of 
partisanship is strongest for voting behaviour’ (Dalton 2000: 21). 
The concept is also understood as a surrogate for party affiliation, since in the USA and 
elsewhere there has never been the kind of party membership that existed in Western 
Europe structuring voting behaviour. Particularly for this reason it seemed to be reasonable 
to apply the concept in an African context with many young and non-institutionalised par-
ties which may not as yet have a strong membership base. However, it should be noted that 
there are serious doubts, based on experience in Western Europe, about the validity of the 
operationalisation of the concept and the universally applied question ‘Do you feel close to 
any political party?’. It is not clear whether the question ‘measures’ the supposed longer-
term affective partisanship.11
Our survey indicates that almost half of the Zambians respondents identify (49%) with one 
party. Whether this is a high or low and what this then implies is unclear. In various Afro-
barometer country surveys party identification varies from as high as 81% in Malawi to 29% 
in Uganda. The 2002 Afrobarometer survey of Zambia detected a party identification of only 
36%. The difference between the two surveys might be attributed to various causes, some of 
them methodological (sampling), conceptual (not measuring a long-term alignment) or even 
drastic political changes. In face of the high score of Malawi with basically no multi-party 
history until 1994, the conceptual fallacy or problem seems to be the most likely.12 Compared 
with established democracies – Denmark 52% (1971-98), Netherlands 38% (1971-98), Ger-
many 78% (1972-1998), United States 77% (1952-96) – both Zambian figures would not be 
completely unfavourable (Dalton 2000: 25). 
Party identification among the different ethno-political groups is most widespread among 
the Lunda-Luvale (60%, n = 65) and the Tonga (55%, n = 240) and less among Bemba (45%, n 
= 188). Additionally more people in rural (53%) than in urban areas (40%) (Lusaka and Cop-
perbelt) identify with a party. A comparison of the two most numerous groups of the sam-
ple the Tongas seem to be more ‘particised’ than the Bembas. 
The cross tabulation of ethno-political group and political party identification reveals a pat-
tern that is very similar to the voting intention (see table 11). Following the line of argument 
                                                     
11   See for the general literature Roth 1999: 43. 
12   Even in established democracies like Germany party identification can change within by 20% 
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from above, Bembas identify largely with the two ‘Bemba parties’, MMD and PF, together 
about 65%. Surprisingly, the Tonga almost evenly split their identification in almost equal 
parts between UPND and MMD. Ignoring the groups which turn up in small numbers only, 
the 66 per cent of Lozi and 57 of Nyanjas who identify with MMD seems to be remarkable. 
In sum, apart from the Tonga, the concentration of a particular ethno-political group among 
party identifiers is clearly higher than among voters. This pattern of identification supports 
the assumption that most parties have at least a core ethno-political basis. 
Table 11: Ethno-political group and party identification 
Question:    Which of the following parties do you feel close? 
MMD UPND  UNIP  FDD PF  Others Do not  
know
Total
N%  N% N % N % N %N%  N%  N %  
Bemba  43 47 12 13 8 9 4 4 16 18 6 7 2 2 91 100
Tonga  59 45 63 48 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 3 2 132 100
Lozi 35 66 12 23 2 4 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0  53 100
Nyanja 70 57 18 15 13 11 10 8 5 4 5 4 2 2 123 100
Lunda-Luvale  25 68 6 16 3 8 1 3 1 3 0 0 1 3  37 100
Others  15 54  5 18 2 7 1 4 2 7 3 11 0 0  28 100
Total 247 53 116 25 29 6 22 5 25 5 17 4 8 2 464 100
Notes:  Chi-square = 110,406; df = 30; p = 0.000 (significant at the 0.05 level). 
The next step in the analysis is based on the presumption that party identification can be dif-
ferent from actual party affiliation. The major Zambian parties were selling (and/or distrib-
uting) party cards in the hundreds of thousands. From focus group discussions we learned 
that the question about party membership was understood in different ways. Some people 
said that they were members of a political party but never bought a membership card nor 
did they hold any. Hence, the general question about party membership came close to ‘party 
identification’. We therefore asked additional questions about holding a membership card 
and of which party. Another problem is that some people keep membership cards of more 
than one party.13
This problem also turned up in the survey when 344 respondents said they were members 
of a political party but only 287 held a membership card. This figure amounts to more than a 
                                                     
13   The reason seems to be opportunistic, but also protective as well. They might benefit from show-
ing their cards at rallies if campaigners distribute ‘presents’, but it might also be helpful in contacts 
with state officials, since the administration is partly politicised as it used to be, probably much 
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quarter of party card holders among the interviewees. The cross tabulation revealed a 
somewhat clearer picture than before. Among the MMD and UPND card holding members 
there is a majority of people identifying themselves as Bemba (56%) and Tonga (53%) (table 
12). The higher percentage especially for the Lozi and Lunda-Luvale (or Northwestern) is 
ignored here because of their small n (21 and 22, respectively). The conclusion seems to be 
obvious: there is a ethnically based core membership in MMD and UPND. 
Table 12: Ethno-political group and party affiliation (membership card holding) 
Question:  Can you give us the name of this political party you hold a membership card? 
MMD UPND UNIP FDD PF Others Total 
N %  N%N%N%N%N%   N %  
Bemba  25 56 8 18 5 11 3 7 1 2 3 7 45 100
Tonga  37 38 52 53 114422229 8  1 0 0
Lozi 2 3  7 2   6 1 9003900003 2  1 0 0
Nyanja 40 59 13 19 4 6 7 10 2 3 2 3 68 100
Lunda-Luvale  1 7  7 7   3 1 4151500002 2  1 0 0
Others  10 48 5 24 2 10 0 0 1 5 3 14 21 100
Total 152 53 87 30 13 5 18 6 6 2 10 3 286 100
Notes:  Chi-square = 62,109; df = 25; p = 0.000 (significant at the 0.05 level) 
Finally, we wanted to know which other social structural and also attitudinal factors, which 
are often thought to explain voting behaviour, might be statistically related to voting deci-
sions in Zambia. As we only have a nominal dependent variable we can only use a logistical 
regression to test the ethnic hypothesis (table 13). Voting for UPND is the dependent vari-
able. The independent variables were the three ethnic identities (Bemba, Tonga and Lozi, 
reference group is ‘all other’), the urban/rural divide, sex, employment (employed or unem-
ployed/pensioner), age, education and religious affiliation (catholic, reference group is ‘all 
other’. We also used an attitudinal variable, a democratic attitude index built from six items 
and scaled from 0 = ‘no democratic/authoritarian attitude’ to 6 = ‘high democratic attitude’14.
The result of the applied backward stepwise logistic regression shows that the likelihood to 
vote for UPND is 4.5 times higher if somebody is a Tonga or 2.7 times higher if somebody is 
a Lozi as compared to other ethno-political groups. This, at least, supports the assumption 
that. compared with other social factors, ethnicity provides a major variable for explaining 
                                                     
14   The index’s items: questions related to a) democracy as most preferable regime, b) parliamentary 
controlled government, c) press freedom, d) multi-party system, e) independence of judiciary, f) 
equal voting rights. The positive ‘democratic’ answers were attached a value ‘1’, and ‘0’ for the 
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voting decisions for UPND. In addition, the stronger the democratic attitude and the higher 
the formal educational attainment of a person the more likely is a UPND vote. 
Table 13: Social and attitudinal factors 
Dependent variable: voting for UPND 
The 95% confidence interval for estimate
Independent variables 
OR Sig.
bottom value  top value 
Urban/rural
Bemba
Tonga  4.920 0.000 3.42 7.08 
Lozi 2.796 0.000 1.70 4.59 
Sex
Employment 
Democratic attitude index (0-6)  1.2 0.005 1.05  1.36 
Religion (catholic) 
Age
Education  
(no schooling = 1 / college = 9)  
1.11 0.007 1.03  1.2 
5. Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that ethnicity matters for voter alignment and 
even more so for party affiliation in Zambia. Our individual survey data also suggest a 
number of reservations and qualifications which are partly methodology related. 
Firstly, ethnicity or ethno-political identity is certainly not the only, but one factor that ac-
counts for election outcomes. Perhaps, other factors might be more relevant than expected. 
Ethnicity is clearly not a sufficient explicator for election outcomes but it plays its role. The 
survey data together with aggregate data of several election results suggest, particularly if 
we compare voting alignment, party identification and party affiliation (card holding mem-
bership), a core group of ethnic voters and ethnic party members. 
Secondly, the degree of ethnic voting can differ from one ethno-political group to the other. 
For some ethnic and ethno-political groups ethnicity appears to be more important than for 
others as an explicator for voter alignment and party affiliation. Usually this can be attrib-
uted to different degrees of ethnic mobilisation, up to ‘particisation’ of ethnicity, but, again, 
this needs an additional qualification which implies a methodological issue. 
Smaller ethnic groups and some ethno-political subgroups do not identify with a particular 
party. Hence the political elite as well as the particular electorate can choose among different 
parties. Obviously, the elites disagree among themselves and affiliate with different parties; 
and so does the electorate. These smaller groups seem to provide a substantial number of 30 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation
shifting voters (apart from urban areas, they are in Eastern, Northwestern and Western 
Province). All this makes it difficult to trace and analyse them in the various data collections. 
But this does not imply automatically they do not vote and affiliate along ethnic lines. 
Our survey did not cover the ethnicity of the local winning candidate and its party affilia-
tion. So we could not control for voting in relation to the ethnicity of the candidate. As Pos-
ner’s (2005: 224-228) analysis of aggregate data for a number of elections shows, the candi-
date’s tribal affiliation matters as well, although the estimated difference between ‘voters 
from dominant tribes’ (0.63) and ‘from non-dominant tribes’ (0.52) voting for ‘candidates 
from dominant tribes’ is not very high. At least, this also suggests that ethnicity is not ‘the 
only game in town’, but still a crucial one. 
In the end, taking the evidence of inferences from aggregate election data together with the 
survey data, one cannot escape the conclusion that certain reoccurring voting patterns can-
not be explained by voters’ decisions based on ‘evaluative’ assessment of individual candi-
dates’ performance. Taken together these findings imply that ethnicity can still be viewed as 
the major factor explaining party affiliation in Zambia, and to a lesser degree voter align-
ment. Ethnic affiliation and voting is not understood as ‘traditional’, non-rational or affec-
tive only but based on a strategically calculated choice. 
A final methodological caveat remains to be stated, namely, that an approach based on self-
evaluation of people – about the reason why they themselves or other people voted for a 
party or candidate – does yield questionable results. At least our survey yielded contradict-
ing results. Moreover the assumption that voters relate their decision to candidates' per-
formance does not hold true for Zambia; the party and its identification with a particular 
ethno-political group seems to be more important. As many other African countries have 
very similar electoral systems – single member plurality with party endorsement – it can 
safely be stated that this can be applied to other countries as well. This conclusion is also 
supported by John Carey and Matthew Shugart’s (1995) finding that this particular electoral 
system is the most party-orientated type. Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation 31
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Appendix A 
Coverage of provinces  Survey districts  Population % of 
national
Respondents  % of  
sample 
Copperbelt Kitwe, Ndola 1,581,221  22.4 92 9.2
Eastern Chipata, Katete 1,306,173  18.6 212 21.2
Luapula Mwense, Samfya 775,353 11.0 123 12.3
Lusaka Lusaka 1,391,329 19.8 259 25.9
Southern Choma, Sinazongwe 1,212,124 17.2 194 19.4
Western Senanga, Lukulu 765,088 10.9 121 12.1
Central 1,012,257 10 - -
Northern 1,258,696 13 - -
Northwestern 583,350 6 - -
Total (without Central,  
Northern, North-Western) 
7,031,288 100.0 1,001 100.0
Source:  Central Statistical Office of Zambia 2003. 
Appendix B 
Sex Count Valid 
percent
%
Male 525 52.8 52.4
Female 469 47.2 46.9
Valid N 994 100.0 99.3
No answer 7 0.0 0.7
Total 1,001 100.0 100.0
Appendix C 
Ethnic  
groups 
Count Valid
percent
% Morrison et al. 
(1986: 702),  
in % 
Language
census  
1990
Bemba 189 18.9 18.9 37 39.7
Tonga 227 22.7 22.7 19 14.8
Lozi 116 11.6 11.6 7 7.5
Nyanja 61 6.1 6.1 15 20.1
Luvale 26 2.6 2.6 91 8.84
Tumbuka 42 4.2 4.2 3 3.7
Ila 8 0.8 0.8 23
Nsenga 50 5.0 5.0 2
Lenje 5 0.5 0.5 43
Luchazi 10 1.0 1.0 x
Lunda 22 2.2 2.2 1
Other tribes  243 24.3 24.3
None 1 0.1 0.1
Total 1,001 100.0 100.0
Notes:  1 figure comprises Lunda. 
2 included in Nyanja. 
3 figure included in Tonga. 
4 Northwestern, comprises Lunda and others. 
Source:  Central Statistical Office 1995: 36. 36 Erdmann: Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation
Appendix D 
Question:  If there were to be parliamentary elections today, for which political party 
would you vote (March 2004)? 
Count Valid 
percent
%
MMD 344 35.7  34.4 
UPND 232 24.1  23.2 
UNIP 70 7.3 7.0 
FDD 32 3.3 3.2 
HP 22 2.3 2.2 
ZRP 6 0.6  0.6 
PF 57 5.9 5.7 
Others 3 0.3  0.3 
Abstain 121  12.6  12.1 
Do not know 77 8.0  7.7 
Valid N  964  100.0  96.3 
No answer  37 0.0  3.7 
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